

# Space Radiation Effects on Microelectronics

---

Presented by the Radiation Effects Group

Section 514

Sammy Kayali, Section Manager

# Radiation Effects in Space

---

Radiation Is a Discriminating Environment for JPL Missions

Dealing with Potential Radiation Problems Is Critical for Mission Success

- Complex problem, made worse by evolving technology
- Past mission performance illustrates how JPL can be successful in space
- Learning from previous mistakes and oversights is also important

This Course Is Intended to Increase Awareness of Radiation Issues

- Attended by designers and spacecraft operational personnel
- Limited in scope
  - Not intended to make everyone an expert
  - Provides basic information and points of contact

# Examples of Radiation Problems in Spacecraft

---

## Special Redesign of 2901 Microprocessor for Galileo

- Problem identified during design and evaluation
- Potential “show stopper” for Galileo mission

## Resets in Hubble Space Telescope after Upgrade in 1996

- Caused by transients from optocouplers
- Occurred when spacecraft flew through South Atlantic anomaly

## Failures of Optocouplers on Topex-Poseidon

## Resets in Power Control Modules on Cassini

## High Multiple-Bit Error Rate in Cassini Solid-State Recorder

# Available Resources at JPL

---

## Laboratory Facilities and Test Technology

- Cobalt-60 test cell
- Frequent off-site tests at accelerators

## Experienced, Knowledgeable Personnel

- Aware of project needs
- Continual evaluation and modeling of new technologies

## RADATA Data Base

## Reports and Technical Papers

## Key Contacts for Radiation Effects Issues

---

Allan Johnston, Acting Group Supervisor

Leif Scheick

Gary Swift

Steve McClure

Larry Edmonds

Farokh Irom

Tetsuo Miyahira

Bernard Rax

Steve Guertin

Jeff Wisdom

Candice Yui

# Course Outline

---

Introduction

Overview of Radiation Environments

Recoverable Single-Event Upset Effects

Non-Recoverable Single-Event Upset Effect

Total Dose Effects

Displacement Damage and Special Issues for Optoelectronics

Summary

## **Section II: Overview of Radiation Environments**

---

Allan H. Johnston  
Electronic Parts Engineering Office  
Section 514

# Radiation Environments

---

## Energetic Particles Causing Single-Event Upset


- Galactic cosmic rays
- Cosmic solar particles (heavily influenced by solar flares)
- Trapped protons in radiation belts

## Radiation Causing “Global” Radiation Damage


- Trapped protons in radiation belts
- Trapped electrons in radiation belts
- Protons from solar flares

# Trapped Radiation Belts around Earth


---



## Energy Distribution in the Earth's Proton Belt



# Trapped Belt Energy Distributions on Jupiter and Earth



# Space Systems at JPL

---

## Interplanetary Missions

- Jupiter and Saturn
  - Intense radiation belts
  - Very high radiation levels [ $> 1 \text{ Mrad(Si)}$ ]
- Mars Missions
  - Orbiters
  - Landers
- Asteroids, Comets and Solar Probes

## Earth Orbiting Missions

- Typical radiation levels  $< 20 \text{ krad(Si)}$ 
  - Depends on altitude and inclination
  - Affected by south Atlantic anomaly
- Less margin between specified radiation environment and reality

# Solar Flares

---

## Solar Cycle Has Eleven-Year Periodicity

## Solar Flares Produce Heavy Ions and Protons

- Heavy ion spectrum is less energetic than galactic cosmic ray spectrum
- Protons from solar flares are important for earth orbiting and deep space programs
  - Protons from a single flare produce fluences up to  $\sim 2 \times 10^{10}$  p/cm<sup>2</sup>
  - Shielding can be effective for lower energies

## Solar Flare Intensity Varies Over a Wide Range

- JPL “design-case” flare usually used for specifications
- Many systems never experience a large flare

# Mechanisms for Global Permanent Damage

---


## Electrons and Protons Produce Ionization in Semiconductors

- Ionization excites carriers from conduction to valence band
- Charge is trapped at interface regions
- Units: rad(material)       $1 \text{ rad} = 100 \text{ ergs/g of material}$
- Depends on bias conditions and device technology
- Typical effect: threshold shift in MOS transistors


## Displacement Damage Also Occurs

- “Collision” between incoming particle and lattice atom
- Lattice atom is moved out of normal position
- Degrades minority carrier lifetime
- Typical effect: degradation of gain and leakage current in bipolar transistors

# Mechanisms for Heavy Ion and Proton SEU Effects



## Integral Cosmic Ray Spectra



# SEE Sensitivity Benchmarks

---

## Heavy Ion Susceptibility


- Spectrum falls sharply above 30 MeV-cm<sup>2</sup>/mg
- Effective threshold for concern is much higher, 75 MeV-cm<sup>2</sup>/mg
  - Charge produced by ions depends on total path length
  - Increases as  $1/(\cos \theta)$

## Proton Susceptibility

- Proton upset is possible for devices with  $LET_{th} < 15 \text{ MeV-cm}^2/\text{mg}$
- Proton testing should be done for all devices with thresholds below that level



# CMOS Technology

---



## Bulk and Epitaxial Substrates


---



# Bipolar Technology

---

## Structure of a bipolar transistor



## **Section III: Recoverable SEU Effects**

---

Gary M. Swift  
Electronic Parts Engineering Office  
Section 514

# SEE Effects in Operational Spacecraft

---

“Safehold” Condition in DS-1 Shortly after Launch

Multiple-Bit Errors in Cassini Solid-State Recorder

- Occurred even though extensive testing was done during design phase
- Attributed to system architectural flaw

Inadvertent Switching of Cassini Power Modules to Standby Mode

- Caused by transients from PM139 comparator
- Low probability because of high input voltage used in design

# Single-Event Upset

---

## First Observed in Bipolar Flip-Flops in 1979

- Original work treated with skepticism
- SEU has emerged as one of the major issues for application of microelectronics in space


## Previous JPL Missions Have Struggled with SEU Problems

- Galileo used a 2901 bit-slice microprocessor (bipolar technology)
- Initial testing showed SEU susceptibility, at moderate rate
- Subsequent die design changes increased the SEU rate beyond the point where the device was useable
- Sandia National Laboratory designed a special rad-hard CMOS version that was used on the spacecraft

## SEU Effects Have Become Worse as Devices Have Evolved

- Lower “critical charge” because of small device dimensions
- Large numbers of transistors per chip and overall complexity

## Cassini SSR Errors During Solar Flare



# Overview

---

How storage elements are upset

- SRAM
- DRAM

What are “cross-section” and “L.E.T.”

How space upset rates are calculated


Upset mitigation techniques

Other effects

- SEFI
- Transients


## Ion Strike on a p-n Junction

---



## How an SRAM Cell Upsets

---



# What is LET?

---

Measure of energy deposition in a material  
- for example: silicon

Linear Energy Transfer

Units are MeV per mg/cm<sup>2</sup> (energy per areal density)

Proportional to MeV/ $\mu$  or pC/ $\mu$

# What is Cross Section?


---

Measure Of Susceptibility


Units = area ( $\text{cm}^2$  or  $\mu^2$ )

Dart Board Analogy

## Upset Mechanism for DRAMs




## Single-Event Upset in 64-Mb DRAMs



## Proton Reaction in a p-n Junction

---



# Upset from Protons

---

## Proton LET Is Extremely Low

- Proton upset is usually dominated by nuclear reactions
- Secondary reaction products have much higher LET, but have short ranges compared to galactic cosmic rays


## Proton Testing Provides only Limited Information about SEE Sensitivity

- “Effective” LET of protons is 3-12 MeV-cm<sup>2</sup>/mg
- Depends on device construction

## Significance of Proton Upset

- Important because protons can make a large contribution to the overall upset rate (particularly for low earth orbits)
- Proton testing is cheaper and easier than tests with heavy ions
- In many cases proton test data may be the only available information



## Proton Recoil Distribution in a Surface Barrier Detector that Is 50 $\mu\text{m}$ Thick



# How Space Upset Rates Are Calculated

## Measure $\sigma$ vs. LET


- Testing done at high-energy accelerator
- Cross-section determined from circuit response



## Determine Sensitive Volume


- Requires assumptions about device construction
- Used to determine effect of ions that strike the device at an angle

ERROR RATE



## Integrate with LET Spectrum


## Dependence of Cross Section on Stopping Power




# SEU Rates

(Interplanetary Space)

---



## Dependence of PC603e Cross Section on Test Method



# Hamming Codes

---

“SECDED” = Single Error Correction  
Double error Detection

- example: (39, 32) = 32 data bits + 7 parity

“DECTED” = Double Error Correction  
Triple Error Detection

- example: (79, 64) = 64 data bits + 15 parity

EDAC word error rate is approximately one half of:

$$\frac{T_{\text{scrub}}}{N_{\text{EDAC}}} U^2$$

# EDAC Issues

---

## Error-detection-and-correction

- Used in solid-state recorders on many JPL spacecraft
- Different levels of correction, depending on algorithm
  - Single and double bit detection, with single-bit correction
  - Double bit detection and correction (larger word size)


## EDAC algorithms can fail at high rates

- Solar flares
- Transitions through radiation belts


# Multiple Bit Upsets in OKI DRAM

Col. #:	008	007	006	005	004	003	002	001	000
01	01	01	01	01	01	01	01	01	01
02	02	02	02	02	02	02	02	02	02
03	03	03	03	03	03	03	03	03	03
04	04	04	04	04	04	04	04	04	04
05	05	05	05	05	05	05	05	05	05
06	06	06	06	06	06	06	06	06	06
07	07	07	07	07	07	07	07	07	07
08	08	08	08	08	08	08	08	08	08
09	09	09	09	09	09	09	09	09	09
0A	0A	0A	0A	0A	0A	0A	0A	0A	0A
0B	0B	0B	0B	0B	0B	0B	0B	0B	0B
0C	0C	0C	0C	0C	0C	0C	0C	0C	0C
0D	0D	0D	0D	0D	0D	0D	0D	0D	0D
0E	0E	0E	0E	0E	0E	0E	0E	0E	0E
0F	0F	0F	0F	0F	0F	0F	0F	0F	0F
10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11	11
12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12	12

## Cassini SSR Architectural Flaw



## Functional Interrupt Effect ("SEFI")



# Circuit Technologies where SEFI Is Important

---

## Advanced Memories

- Internal test modes
- Microprogrammed cell architecture

## Flash Memories

- Dominant effect
- “Crashes” internal state controller and buffers


## Xilinx Programmable Logic Arrays

## Microprocessors

- Many categories of responses
- Detection and recovery are very difficult problems


## Non-Recoverable Errors in the 486 Processor

---




## Output Pulses from Ion Strikes on a Comparator

---



## Cross Section for Transients in the PM139 Comparator



## Calculated Upset Rate for Cassini Power Modules

---

Assumed Environment	Aspect Ratio	Errors per Switch-Day
GCR, solar minimum	5:1	$4.5 \times 10^{-5}$
GCR, solar maximum	5:1	$8.2 \times 10^{-6}$
Design-case solar flare	5:1	$1.6 \times 10^{-2}$

# SEE Testing

---

Why so expensive?

Remote, Expensive Facilities (Accelerators)

Test Development


Special Problems

- Part De-lidding
- In Vacuum Operation

## Toshiba Angle Plot

---

**Cross Section vs. Azimuthal Angle for a Toshiba  
64Mb DRAM Using F at  $48^\circ$  (polar plot)**



# Summary

---

SEE Effects Are an Important Issue for All Spacecraft  
Testing and Evaluation of the Impact of SEE Is a Complex Problem

- Few problems with older spacecraft because of thorough testing
- Likely to become more severe for newer technologies

Section 514 Continually Evaluates SEE Effects

- Direct Support to Many JPL Programs
- Testing of Advance Microprocessors for REE
- Evaluation of Advanced Devices under the NEPP Program

## **Section IV: Nonrecoverable SEU Effects**

---

Leif Z. Scheick  
Electronic Parts Engineering Office  
Section 514

# Non-Recoverable SEE

---

Events which interrupt device function and do not recover without external interaction

These events may permanently damage the device

Three main types

- Latchup (SEL)
- Hard errors (SHE)
- Rupture/Burnout (SEGR/SEB)

# Latchup Is a Common Problem for CMOS Technology


---

Latchup paths are inherent in most CMOS circuits because of the fabrication technology



The commercial Modem on Pathfinder's Rover was susceptible to latchup

- Laboratory tests showed that the latchup was not destructive
  - This allowed the device to remain latched for periods of several minutes
  - A simple power cycle counter measure was used in the application
- The latchup probability was low for this application
  - Short mission life (nominally two weeks)
  - Risk deemed acceptable by mission planners

## SEL Latchup Path



## SEL I-V Characteristics



## SEL Facts

---

Triggered by heavy ions, protons, neutrons

May be catastrophic

Only recovered by power cycle


SEL is strongly temperature dependent

- Threshold for latchup decreases at high temperature
- Cross section increases as well


Modern devices may have many different latchup paths

- Both high current and low current SELs can occur
- Characterization of latchup is a difficult problem for complex circuits

## SEL LET Dependence




# SEL Ion Range Dependence



## SEL Example: Induced by Protons in K-5

---





**SEL occurred at 0.4 MeV  
cm<sup>2</sup>/mg**

- Due to nuclear recoils
- Cross section of  $6.7 \times 10^{-8} \text{ cm}^2$

**Many of the latchup events  
were destructive**



## SEL Heating

---




## SEL Heating\*

---




# SEL Heating

---




# SEL Temperature Dependence



## SEL Temperature Dependence\*

---



# SEL Counter Measures

---

## SEL Detection and Mitigation

- Current limiting devices can't stop latchups or low current latchups
- Detection circuits can't stop all latchups
  - Some devices have latchup modes which are always destructive
- Mitigation may not be fast enough
- Thorough testing required to ensure that all latchup events are detected

# SEL Technology Options

---

## Device type

- Bulk CMOS latches worst
  - **COTS**
- CMOS deposited on epitaxial layer may improve SEL immunity
  - **Some COTS - More Expensive**
  - **Not always effective (e.g., K-5 processor)**
- SOI and isolated oxides are mostly immune
  - **Very expensive**
  - **Limited availability**

# Single Hard Errors

---

Large rare energy depositions can cause individual cells to be unable to change state

- Referred to as a “stuck bit” in memory

This is a microdose effect

- Microlatchups can cause a fraction of bits to be unable to change state

Power cycling is required

# Destructive SEEs

---


## Gate Rupture (permanent failure of oxide)

- Power devices are most susceptible
- Programmable devices also susceptible
- Very thin oxides in VLSI devices


## Burnout

- Caused by excessive localized current within the structure
- Power transistors
- Some types of linear integrated circuits

## Destructive SEEs



Single Event Gate Rupture Power MOSFET



Single Event Burnout HEXFET

## SEB Facts

---

Triggered by heavy ions, and possibly by protons and neutrons

Always destructive

CMOS, power BJTs and MOSFETs are susceptible

Mechanism:

- Localized current in body of device
- Roughly analogous to second breakdown in power transistors
- Devices with low doping concentrations are most susceptible

# SEGR Facts

---

Triggered by heavy ions

Always destructive to device

Dependent on angle of incidence

Dependent on electric field in gate oxide

- **May also occur with zero electric field**
- **Interplay between pulsed current in drain region and oxide field**

Synergy between TID and SEE

Power MOSFETs most susceptible

- **Some modern programmable devices are also susceptible**

# SEGR/SEB Examples

---

## SEGR

### EEPROM

- During writing/erasing

### LAMBDA ASIC

### Power MOSFET

- LET threshold of 25 MeV-cm<sup>2</sup>/mg with drain biased at 1/2 rated maximum, and zero voltage on gate

## SEB

### CRUX/APEX

- 2N6796 had a LET threshold of 15 MeV-cm<sup>2</sup>/mg

## Dealing with SEGR and SEB

---

Test all device types that are potentially susceptible

Derate devices well below maximum rated values

- Possible for discrete power devices
- Not appropriate for SEGR or SEB in integrated circuits

Minimize duty cycle for application of high voltage to susceptible parts

Program high voltage device in low radiation environments

# Summary

---

## Latchup

- Temperature dependent
- Epi devices are generally better
- Prevention circuits not necessarily effective
- Best approach is to avoid using latchup-prone devices

## Gate Rupture and Burnout

- High voltage devices are generally more susceptible
- Derate devices well below maximum operating conditions
- Ensure that all sensitive technologies undergo testing

## **Section V: Total Dose Effects**

---

Dr. John F. Conley, Jr.  
Electronic Parts Engineering Office  
Section 514

# Space Radiation Effects

---

## 1) Single Event Effects (SEE)

- Hard / Permanent
- Soft / Recoverable


## 2) Total Ionizing Dose (TID)

- Usually dominated by protons
- Electrons are important for some planetary missions

## 3) Displacement Damage (DD)

## Galileo Total Dose Problem

---




**Critical Part (DG181)**

- All Galileo parts were subjected to thorough radiation testing
- Failures did not occur until radiation level was close to design level
- New programs use less stringent design methods

# X2000/Europa Shielding Analysis

---




# Outline

---

- Radiation Environment Shielding
- Basic Mechanisms
- MOS
- Bipolar
- COTS
- Testing
- Warnings and Misconceptions
- Recommendations

# Near Earth TID Environment



---



- Total accumulated dose depends on orbit altitude, orientation, and time.

# TID Shielding

- Electrons more effectively shielded than protons
- Incremental shielding gives diminished returns




# Total Dose Effects in MOS Devices

Charge trapping in SiO<sub>2</sub> and at Si/SiO<sub>2</sub> interface.

1. Oxide Trapping (N<sub>ot</sub>)

2. Interface Trapping (N<sub>it</sub>)

- Dominated by point defects



$$V_{th} = V_{th}' + \underbrace{\phi_{MS}}_{\text{Metal/Semi Work Function}} - \underbrace{\frac{Q_F}{C_o}}_{\text{Fixed Charge}} - \underbrace{\frac{Q_M \gamma_M}{C_o}}_{\text{Mobile Ions}} - \underbrace{\frac{N_{it} \cdot e \cdot (2\phi_f)}{C_{ox}}}_{\text{Interface Traps}} - \underbrace{\frac{N_{ot} \cdot e}{C_{ox}}}_{\text{Oxide Traps}}$$

$$V_{th}' = 2\phi_F \pm (K_S/K_O) \chi_o \sqrt{\frac{4qN_B}{K_S \epsilon_o}} \pm \phi_F$$

# Basic Mechanisms


(1) Electron-Hole ( $e^-/h^+$ ) Pair Generation  
-  $\sim 17$  eV / pair for  $\text{SiO}_2$

(2)  $e^-/h^+$  Pair Recombination / Yield  
- Source  
- Field

(3) Electron and Hole Transport  
-  $e^- \sim \text{psec}$   
-  $h^+ \sim \text{msec} - \text{sec}$

(4) Hole Trapping  
- Precursor Density  
- Cross section

(5) Interface Trap Formation  
- Delayed buildup



**DEVICE PARAMETER SHIFT** 84

## What Is a rad?

---

$$1 \text{ rad} = 100 \text{ erg / gram}$$

$$\# \text{ electron-hole pairs (SiO}_2\text{)} \sim 8.1 \times 10^{12} \text{ /cm}^3 \text{ / rad}$$

Energy Unit Conversion of rad

↓

$$\frac{\# \text{ pairs}}{\text{rad} \cdot \text{cm}^3} = \left[ \left( \frac{100 \text{ ergs}}{\text{gram}} \right) \left( \frac{10^{-7} \text{ J}}{\text{erg}} \right) \left( \frac{\text{eV}}{1.6 \times 10^{-19} \text{ J}} \right) \right] \cdot (2.2 \text{ g / cm}^3)$$

17 +/- 1 eV


↑

(electron-hole pair creation energy in SiO<sub>2</sub>)


$\rho_{\text{SiO}_2}$   
↓

# Recombination and Yield



- Radiation source and oxide field dependent




# Total Dose Defects in MOS Devices



# Influence of Hole Traps and Interface Traps on CV and IV Curves





## Influence of Interface and Oxide Trapped Charge



## Effects of Bias

- Bias has a strong influence on the radiation response
- Powering down a device can sometimes improve radiation response
- A powered device is not always worst case




# Annealing

## 1) Tunnel Annealing

- Spatial Dependence
- Log time dependence

## 2) Thermal Annealing


- Energy Dependence
- Temp. Dependence




# Dose Rate Effects

- Hole traps and interface traps build-up and anneal on different time scales.
- Irradiation at different dose rates can produce different failure mechanisms and total dose hardness.
- When time is considered, dose rate effects in CMOS disappear.

$\Delta V_{th}$  vs. Dose



$\Delta V_{it}$  vs. Time




# Oxide Thickness


Trapping drops off steeply in thin oxides but there are still problems:

- 1) Radiation Induced Leakage Currents (RILC) in ultrathin oxides
- 2) Thick oxides:
  - i. Power MOSFETs
  - ii. Field oxides
  - iii. Silicon-on-insulator (SOI) buried oxides
  - vi. Bipolar devices.

## Interface Traps





## Hole Traps




# Radiation Induced Leakage Current (RILC)


- Reported in thin oxides (<10 nm) at high doses (>1Mrad).
- Similar to stress induced leakage current (SILC).
- Thought to be due to trap assisted tunneling.
- Possible failure mechanism for flash memories.



# Field Oxide Leakage






- Field oxides thick and poorly controlled.
- Dominant failure mechanism for commercial processes.
- Geometry is critical.




# Silicon-on-Insulator (SOI)

- SOI Advantages:**
1. Total Isolation
  2. SEU Immune
  3. High Speed
  4. Low Power
  5. Latchup Eliminated

- New SOI Total Dose Leakage Paths:**
1. Back Channel Leakage
  2. Sidewall Leakage




# Flash Memories




# Linear BJT

## Structure of a bipolar transistor




# Bipolar Transistor: Gain Degradation




- Charge trapped at and near the interface above the base region can degrade gain and increase leakage.

## Gain Degradation of Two Transistor Types Used on Cassini




## Extremely Low Dose Rate Sensitivity (ELDRS)




- Some bipolar device show extreme degradation at low dose rates.


## ELDRS: Effect of Dose Rate on $I_b$ for LM111 Comparator




# ELDRS



# ELDRS Degradation Model - Space Charge Effects



## ELDRS in Space: LM124 Op-Amp




105

\*Titus et al., IEEE Trans. Nucl. Sci. 46, 1608 (1999).

# Testing

## MOS Testing: MIL-STD 883D, 1019




## BiPolar/ELDR: ASTM F-1892 Pre-screen

Group 1: Irradiate at ~50 rad(Si)/s & 25°C


Group 2: Irradiate at ~50 rad(Si)/s & 100°C

Group 3: Irradiate at 0.01-0.1 rad(Si)/s & 25°C


If 2 or 3 worse than 1, then fail part or test further.




## COTS Variability: OP27 Op-Amp




## COTS: Same Part, Different Failure Mechanism




## COTS / ELDRS Part Variation: Same Manufacturer



## COTS / ELDRs: Manufacturer Variation



## Warning: Space Qualified Isn't Always



## Warnings / Common Misperceptions

---

- No bias does not mean that no damage will occur
  - Linear IC's can exhibit more damage when unbiased
  - Discrete transistor damage is about a factor of two lower when unbiased
  - CMOS bias effects are very complex
    - Generally some improvement when parts are unbiased
    - Needs to be checked on part-by-part basis
- Radiation data is not “generic”
  - Do not assume that data from one manufacturer applies to same part type from another manufacturer
  - Radiation response may change as manufacturing process evolves
- Characterization data must encompass use conditions
  - Example: linear IC data with +/- 15V power supplies cannot be used for 5/0 V applications
  - Total dose data bases are of limited value
  - Be aware of ELDRS

## Recommendations

---

1. Get Radiation Testing office involved early
2. Consider using a part where radiation data already exists
3. When radiation testing is done, prepare course of action for parts that fail
  - Shielding
  - Redesign
  - Scheduling delay/cost factors
4. Lot acceptance testing is generally recommended (except for missions with very low levels)
5. Use extreme care when archival data is used

# Conclusions

---

Total dose effects have not been a major factor in older missions

- Thorough radiation testing and parts control
- Conservative design specifications

Total dose effects will be more important for new systems

- Minimal radiation testing and parts control
- Less conservative design specifications
- New effects (particularly ELDRs)
- Subtle failure modes in complex parts

Sensitive Technologies

- Technologies with internal charge pumps (e.g., flash memories)
- High-precision linear integrated circuits
- Field oxide failures in advanced CMOS

Most Total dose problems are avoidable or preventable

- Total dose must be a design criteria

## Typical Total Dose Failure Levels of Various Technologies

---

<u>Technology</u>	<u>Failure Level [Krad(Si)]</u>
Linear IC's	2 - 50
Mixed-signal IC's	2 - 30
Flash Memories	5 - 15
DRAMs	15 - 50
Microprocessors	15 - 70

## Further Reading

---

1. Ma, T.P., and P.V. Dressendorfer, *Ionizing Radiation Effects in MOS Devices and Circuits*, (Wiley and Sons, New York, 1989).
2. P.V. Dressendorfer, "Basic Mechanisms for the New Millenium," in 1998 *IEEE NSREC Short Course*, (IEEE, Piscataway, NJ, 1998).
3. All IEEE Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects Conference (NSREC) Proceedings (see December issues of IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science, 1964-present).
4. All IEEE NSREC Radiation Effects Data Workshops (199x-present).
5. All IEEE NSREC Radiation Effects Short Courses (1980-present).
6. J. Bennedetto, "Economy-Class Ion-Defying ICs in Orbit," IEEE SPECTRUM, March 1998, p. 36-41.
7. T. Oldham, *Ionizing Radiation Effects in MOS Oxides*, (World Scientific, River Edge, NJ, 1999).

## **Section VI: Displacement Damage and Special Issues for Optoelectronics**

---


Allan H. Johnston  
Electronic Parts Engineering Office  
Section 514

# Displacement Damage for High Energy Transfer

## Displacement Cascade

Several damage clusters are produced by the collision

Damage is caused by movement of lattice atom after primary collision



# Displacement Damage

---


## Effects of Displacement Damage in Semiconductors

- Minority carrier lifetime is degraded
  - Reduces gain of bipolar transistors
  - Also affects optical detectors and some types of light-emitting diodes
  - Effects become important for proton fluences above  $1 \times 10^{10}$  p/cm<sup>2</sup>
- Mobility and carrier concentration are also affected

## Particles Producing Displacement Damage


- Protons (all energies)
- Electrons with energies above 150 keV
- Neutrons (from on-board power sources)

## Energy Dependence of Displacement Damage in Silicon




## Effects of Gamma and Proton Irradiation on Input Bias Current of a Differential Comparator


---



# Displacement Damage in a Voltage Regulator



## Displacement Damage in a Hardened Op-Amp




## Displacement Damage Comparisons


---

Particle Type	Total Dose [rad(Si)]	Fluence (#/cm <sup>2</sup> )	Equiv. Neutron Fluence (n/cm <sup>2</sup> )
electrons (100 MeV)	100k	$3.3 \times 10^{12}$	$3.8 \times 10^{11}$
electrons (2 MeV)	100k	$4.1 \times 10^{12}$	$8.6 \times 10^{10}$
protons (50 MeV)	100k	$6.2 \times 10^{11}$	$1.4 \times 10^{12}$

# Degradation of Light-Emitting Diodes




## Comparison of Two LED Technologies




# Optocoupler Construction

---




(a) Sandwich structure  
(direct coupling to detector)



(b) Lateral structure  
(reduced coupling efficiency)

# Optocoupler Degradation



# Failure of Optocouplers on Topex-Poseidon

---


## High-Inclination Earth Orbit

- 1300 km, 98 degrees
- Goes through lower edge of proton radiation belts

## Optocouplers Used in Five Different Circuit Applications

- Failure occurred in thruster status application after 2.7 years
  - Design did not consider displacement damage
  - Circuit failure corresponds to a factor of four reduction in current-transfer ratio
  - Cold “spares” of little value for displacement damage
- Optocouplers continue to work satisfactorily in thruster firing circuit
  - Consequence of higher circuit margin used by designers

## Failure of Power Converters Due to Optocoupler Degradation



# Optocoupler Transients


---

## Voltage System Shutdown Occurred on Hubble Space Telescope

- Observed after upgraded electronics were installed
- Strongly correlated with orbit pattern


## Laboratory Tests Showed that Shutdown Was Caused by Transients from Protons

- Dominated by charge in photodetector
- Heavy ions also produce transients




## Example of Transients from Protons for 6N134 Optocoupler

---



## Angular Dependence of Proton Upset Cross Section



## Course Summary

---

# Environments and System Requirements

---

## JPL Systems Have a Variety of Mission Requirements

- Short duration missions with low radiation levels
- Interplanetary missions with extremely high levels
- Earth-orbiting missions where proton effects dominate

## Overall Mission Requirements Must Be Understood

- “Reflexive” policies and procedures should be avoided
- Testing is not always required

## Using Parts Where Radiation Data Exists Can Be Cost Effective

# Single-Event Upset

---

## SEE Effects Have Become Worse As Parts Have Evolved

- Device scaling
- Complex internal design and architecture
- Functional interrupt problems

## SEE Testing Has Become More Complex

- Device complexity
- New phenomena
- Multiple-bit upset

## Successful Use of Commercial Parts Depends on System Design

# Permanent Damage from Single-Particles

---

## Latchup Is the Most Critical Catastrophic Damage Issue

- Many CMOS circuits are sensitive to latchup
- Difficult and costly to characterize latchup in detail
- Best alternative is to eliminate latchup-prone devices

## Gate Rupture and Burnout Effects Are Becoming More Important

- Previously only an issue for power MOSFETs
- Permanent damage has been observed in pulse-width modulators
- Testing and qualification methods need to consider these effects

# Total Dose Effects

---

Total Dose Damage Remains a Key Issue for Many Technologies

- **Field oxide failure causes huge increases and functional failure in CMOS**
- **Gate oxide threshold shift is important in many technologies**
- **Internal charge pumps are usually highly susceptible to total dose damage**

Low Dose Rate Damage Effects Are a Major Issue for Bipolar Devices

- **Problem not completely understood**
- **Wide variation among manufacturers**
- **JPL has an excellent facility for tests at very low dose rate**

Devices with High Maximum Voltage Ratings Are Often a Problem

- **Low doping levels**
- **Increased oxide thickness**

# Permanent Damage from Protons and Electrons

---

Permanent Damage Issues Are Often Overlooked

Technologies Where Displacement Effects Matter

- Linear integrated circuits
- Light emitting diodes
- Optical detectors
- Optocouplers

Cobalt-60 Gamma Rays Are a Compromise

- Cost effective
- Appropriate for technologies where displacement damage doesn't matter
- Provides no information about displacement damage effects